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CASE COMMENTS
Courts-Prospective Overruling
P brought an action against his foster father and insurer of his
foster father. P's injuries were sustained while he was riding on
the drawbar of a tractor operated by the foster father on a public
highway. Trial court entered judgment adverse to P. P appealed.
Held, affirmed for insurer; reversed against foster father. Foster
father was not relieved from liability under the parental-immunity
rule. The parental-immunity rule was abolished as to causes on
or after June 28, 1963, except where the negligent act involved
an ordinary parental discretion with respect to the provision of
food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other
care. Goller v. White, 122 N.W.2d 193 (Wis. 1963).
Traditionally, when a court handed down a decision that over-
ruled the old law, the effect was to make the new law apply retro-
actively except in cases where the principle of res judicata or a
statute of limitation prevented this. Fairchild, Torts, 46 MAnQ. L.
REv. 1 (1962). The court in the principal case has gone against
tradition and made the overruling apply prospectively and not retro-
actively. Prospective overruling has come into existence because
of the problems that exist if the overruling is applied retroactively.
When the courts made an overruling prospective only, they are
taking it upon themselves to promulgate a new law and it is debat-
able whether they have the power to do so. Herein lies the main
opposition to prospective overruling.
The real beginning of prospective overruling was stated in Great
Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932). The
Court provided that a state court violated no federal rights by
applying a doctrine of an older case to the case at bar although
deciding that the doctrine was wrong and would not be followed
in the future. Mr. Justice Cardozo, writing for the Court said, "A
state in defining the limits of adherence to precedent may make
a choice for itself between the principle of forward operation and
that of relation backward."
The court stated in Falconer v. Simmons, 51 W. Va. 172, 41
S.E. 193 (1902), that if a common law right was overruled, the old
decision was never law and the transaction, though dating prior to
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the later decision, is governed by the later decision. The court
went along with tradition and made the overruling of the old law
apply retroactively. It was noted that there was an exception to
the above rule. The exception occurred when the right affected
was statutory and there was a decision construing it. If a valid
contract was made under the construction of the statute, a later
decision overruling the prior construction would not affect the
validity of the contract. The Court in Douglas v. County of Pike,
101 U.S. 677 (1879), supported the above exception and provided
that the same effect should be given to a change of judicial con-
struction in respect to a statute in its operation on contracts and
existing contract rights. This would make the overruling prospec-
tive only.
In another West Virginia case, In the Matter of Town of Chesa-
peake, 130 W. Va. 527, 45 S.E.2d 113 (1947), the court, in de-
termining if a circuit court had the right to grant a corporation
charter to a town of over 2000 population, said that the circuit
court never had the right and the right always belonged to the
legislature. The court further stated that the legislature could
make other provisions for the incorporation of towns by a statute
prospective in effect, but these same provisions could not be made
prospective only by judicial action.
A majority of the problems will arise in the tort area if the
overruling is not made prospective only. The court in Parker v.
Port Huron Hosp., 361 Mich. 1, 105 N.W.2d 1 (1960), stated that
the new law overruling the common law rule of charitable immunity
would be applied prospectively only because it would not be fair
to hospitals and other charitable groups to be held liable for their
torts when they did not have the opportunity to take out liability
insurance. If the overruling was applied retroactively the charitable
groups would be liable for past torts unless the statute of limita-
tions had expired on the complaining party. Most of the courts
today that are beginning to hand down overrulings that are to be
applied prospectively only are doing so with tort cases. The court
in Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis.2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618
(1962), said that the common law immunity to municipalities was
ab6lished and the overruling would be prospective only.
When a person has contracted, acquired rights, or acted in re-
liance on the prior decision, and operation of the new holding
retrospectively would result in much harm to such persons, the
19631
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court has generally made the new overruling prospective only and
not retroactive. Safarik v. Udall, 304 F.2d 944 (4th Cir. 1962).
If the overruling is made retroactive the parties having con-
tracted or relied on the old decision have some protection. It is
provided in the United States Constitution that no state shall pass
any bill of attainer, expost facto law or law impairing the obliga-
tion of contracts. U. S. CONST, art. I, § 10.
The court stated in Hernandez v. County of Yuma, 91 Ariz. 35,
369 P.2d 271 (1962), when determining if a court had the right to
change an old rule, if there was no reason for an old rule to
continue to exist, that it was the responsibility of the courts to
change the rule. The court further stated that the responsibility of
the courts does not end just because the legislature has not acted.
There can be no justification to continue to apply an old rule that
is outdated and without a rational basis. In opposition to the
Herandez case, the proposition was stated in Note, 37 HLv. L. Bnv.
409 (1924), that if a court applied a rule prospectively only it would
be plain legislation on the part of the judiciary. One branch of the
government has no right to perform the duties of another. The
duty of the legislature is to make the law and the duty of the
courts is to determine what the law was at the time of the dispute
between the parties and apply the law to the facts before them.
Generally when a court has rendered a decision that changes
the old rule and the effect is to make the new ruling apply pros-
pectively only, the new law also applies to the case at bar when
the decision is made. The reason for this is twofold. First, if a
court merely announced the new law without applying it to the
instant case, it would amount to a mere dictum. Second, and most
important, if the new rule was not applied to the case at bar it
would deprive the party of all benefit of the incentive he had in
getting the old rule changed. Molitor v. Kaneland Community
Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill.2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959).
A few courts in the past several years have started using the
idea of prospective overruling. The main reason these courts have
made the effect of their overrulings prospective only has been to
protect the innocent parties that have relied on an old ruling. As
was shown in Molitor v. Kraneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302,
supra, the whole idea behind prospective overruling is in the
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overruling the old decision makes no reference that the application
is to be prospective only, then the application is to have a retro-
active effect. Because there have been no cases in West Virginia
where an overruling was made to apply prospectively only, it
would seem that West Virginia still follows the traditional view that
overrulings by the courts have to be applied retroactively.
William Walter Smith
Criminal Law-Disqualification of Jurors
D was indicted for the receipt, concealment, and sale of heroin in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1959), convicted by a jury, and
sentenced to fourteen years imprisonment. In D's trial ten of the
twelve jurors had served in previous cases of a similar nature in
which the government had used the same witnesses who testified
in D's case. D contended that this raised a presumption of law
that the entire jury was partial and prejudiced, thus depriving him
of his right to a trial by an impartial jury as guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment. On appeal from district court conviction, held,
affirmed by an equally divided court. Three judges were of the
opinion that prior service by jurors in similar cases developed by
idential witnesses is not prejudicial to D when the case arose out
of separate, distinct, and independent actions. The three dissenting
judges reasoned that a prospective juror or jurors, who have heard
a similar but disconnected case based upon testimony of the same
prosecuting witnesses, should be discharged for implied bias or
prejudice. Casias v. United States, 315 F.2d 614 (10th Cir. 1963).
The courts are in disagreement in fact situations similar to those
in the principal case. The federal courts and the majority of the
state courts which have passed upon the point hold that prior
service of jurors in similar cases where the same witnesses are used
is not prejudicial to the defendant. In Wilkes v. United States, 291
F.2d 988 (6th Cir. 1923), the D was indicted for violation of the
Reed Amendment. The court stated that the fact that some of the
jurors had served in similar cases in which the same government
witnesses were used did not entitle D to dismissal where it was
shown that the jurors on their voir dire had stated they had formed
no opinions about the guilt or innocence of the D. Similarly, in
State v. Mays, 74 Ohio L. Abs. 43, 139 N.E.2d 639 (1956), the D
1963]
4
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 1 [1963], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol66/iss1/6
